

Lessons Learned Database

Individual Incident Summary Report



Incident Title		Multiple LPG Storage Tank Ruptures		
Incident Type		BLEVE		
Date		19 th November 1984		
Country		Mexico		
Location		San Juan Ixhuatepec, HG		
Fatalities				
542		4,248 (Kletz)	US\$ 29 m [*] (2001) – Ref. 3	
Incident Description	A DN 2	200 (8" NS) liquified petroleum ga	s (LPG) transfer line ruptured at a	
the second second	a refinery 400 km (250 miles) away. The leaking LPC formed a vanaur cloud			
- M	which spilled over the hund walls which surrounded the pressurised storage			
	vessels (spheres and bullets) and migrated towards a ground flare. The flame			
A Carlos and	front accelerated back towards the leak source. Several pool fires erupted			
	causing a series of catastrophic boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions			
	(BLEVEs) which blew many of the vessels off their supports. The first BLEVE			
	occurred 15 minutes after the initial release. Burning LPG liquid rained down			
Credit: Sipa/Shutterstock	on the neighbouring shanty town which had expanded to 130 m (427 ft) from			
	the terminal fence. The official death toll was 542 with 4,248 injured but			
	unofficial estimates were higher (shanty town population unknown). Around			
	200,000 people had to be evacuated and \sim 10,000 people became homeless.			
Incident Analysis	Basic cause was a loss of primary containment (LOPC) due to overpressure			
	of an LPG transfer pipe or overfilling of a pressurised storage vessel (exact			
	cause unknown as much of the physical evidence was destroyed by fire).			
	Critical factors included: 1) Defective level instrumentation 2) Inadequate			
	spacing between LPG storage vessels. 3) Storage vessels were surrounded			
	by 1 m high concrete walls (allowing LPG to accumulate where most harmful).			
	4) Absence of passive fire protection (e.g. gas detectors, storage vessel and			
	support fireproofing), 5) The firewater system was disabled in the initial blast,			
	6) Proximity of housing to the terminal perimeter, 7) Arrival of the emergency			
	services was delayed by traffic chaos as panicked residents tried to flee.			
	Root causes included: 1) Inannronriate design (no gradient in hunded area			
	below storage vessels to prevent pooling inadequate vessel spacing and			
	vulnerable above-ground firewater system). 2) Inadequate safeguards			
	(absence of overfill protection, gas detectors and fireproofing of vessels and			
	supports), 3) Inadequate management of change (relief capacity not raised			
	when LPG fill rate increased), 4) Inadequate maintenance (instrumentation),			
	5) Inadequate operator training (ESD system initiated too late), 6) Inadequate			
	emergency response planning (emergency vehicle access and evacuation			
	routes	, 7) Inadequate land use planning	(shanty town too close to terminal).	
Lessons Learned	1) Escalation impact studies should be carried out to inform plant design (e.g.			
	2) LPG bulk storage vessels should be equipped with remote operated			
	emergency isolation valves (FIVs) to minimise inventory loss in case of pine			
	rupture. EIV actuators should be designed so that the valves cannot close			
	too quickly and create a pressure surge through hydraulic hammer.			
	3) High hazard installations should have designated emergency access and			
	egress routes available which should be regularly inspected and tested.			
	4) Land use planning regulations specifying minimum separation distances			
	between high hazard facilities and residential buildings should be enforced.			
More Information	1) "Analysis of the LPG Disaster in Mexico City", C.M. Pietersen, TNO,			
	Apeldoorn, Netherlands.			
	2) API Standard 2510: "Design and Construction of LPG Installations", 9"			
		Euliton, American Petroleum Institute (2020). 3) "The 100 Largest Losses 1972 – 2001" March Property Pick Consulting		
	Practice 20th Edition (2003) I* First party property damage cost only			
Industry Sector	i iaciit	Process Type		
Oil & Gas		Liquified Gas Storage	BI FV/F	
Equipment Category		Equipment Class	Equipment Type	
Mechanical		Pipina	Pipe	